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Comparative Law and Language
Vivian Grosswald Curran
Abstract
Comparative law is law’s cybernetics, or “theory of messiness.” It attempts to
steer through the messiness of the foreign by reordering it into the language of the
familiar without betraying the original. It is needed urgently in contexts of unrec-
ognized metamorphosis, and today metamorphoses are burgeoning in murky areas
outside of law’s traditional categories of either the national or the international.
The less apparent, the less visibly foreign, the foreign is, the more comparative
law has a task of translation involving the formation of a vocabulary to transmit
new configurations that resist detection and articulation. This essay examines the
centrality of translation to processes of language and meaning construction, and
links translation to comparative law as a model for the study of similarity and dif-
ference, the universal and the particular.
The debate in comparative law over the relative importance of similarity and dif-
ference among legal systems has its counterpart in linguistics in conflicting views
about whether commonalities among languages are fundamental or marginal. These
issues situate both language and comparative law between mutually contradictory
aspirations of universalism and pluralism which have stalked the evolution of both
fields. Despite appearances of the ascendancy of universalism in today’s world, it
is not difference and pluralism that are receding, but, rather, that former domains
of pluralism and difference recede, while others emerge.
Like language, inevitably imprecise and perpetually in flux, comparative law can
not be frozen once and for all, to be captured for future application if only it is de-
veloped with sufficient acuity and insight. It shares what Isaiah Berlin attributed
to philosophy and distinguished from the scientific: it does not carry within itself
the method of its own solution, and therefore must be reinvented in each genera-
tion, destroying its own past rigidities and methods of decoding and transmitting,
in order to construct a new modality of analysis, a new vocabulary better adapted
to changed meaning.
Comparative law shares with language the pitfalls of miscommunication and mis-
understanding, as well as the potentials of learning to see, to communicate and
to shed light in that elusive, inevitable, shifting and ever-reconfiguring space that,
like language, it occupies between the same and the other.
1 For their helpful thoughts on some of the issues d iscussed  in this chap ter,  sincerest thanks to  John Allison , Sir
Franklin and Lady Berman, Cécile Desandre, Dan Simpson and Phil Watts.  Unless otherwise noted, translations
are mine.
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[T]he suggestion that inquiries into the meanings of words merely throw light on words is
false.
- H.L.A. Hart
I.  Introduction
At the simplest level of observation, language issues arise in connection to comparative
law because people in different countries speak in different languages, producing legal texts in
foreign languages that become the target of comparative legal studies.  At the same time,
English is gaining ascendancy, if not dominance, with international exchanges in the field
increasingly conducted solely in that single language, whether in scholarly conferences, in
journals targeting an international readership, or in university classes where professors and
students do not share a native language.  These matters of simple observation will be discussed
in Part II, with some suggestion of how they relate to a deeper link between comparative law
and language that is a principal subject of this chapter:  namely, the study of language as a
cognitive model for comparative law.  
Part III discusses language’s dependence on translation inasmuch as translation is the
mechanism central to meaning construction, even within a given language.  Part IV links
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
2translation to comparative law as a model for the study of similarity and difference, of the
universal and the particular, and discusses them in terms of the contrasting categories that
undergird the civil- and common-law legal systems.  It also discusses how post-war
comparative law scholars analyzed these subjects, explaining their rejection of the legal
positivism that increasingly had marked legal theory from the nineteenth century until the
Second World War. 
Part V examines the post-war émigré comparative law scholars’ immersion into a new
language and legal culture, and how that experience informed their scholarly theory on issues
of sameness and difference across legal orders.   It then progresses to the generation that
followed, whose divergence from the post-war perspective has reflected an increasing
incorporation of postmodernist influences.   The debate in comparative law over the relative
importance of similarity and difference among legal systems has its counterpart in linguistics
in conflicting views about whether commonalities among languages are fundamental or merely
marginal.  Part VI shows that these issues situate comparative law between deeply entrenched,
mutually contradictory aspirations of universalism and pluralism which have stalked the
evolution of both language and legal studies.
Universalism may seem to be on the ascendancy today, due to the globalization that
vastly increases contacts in law without impediments from geographical distance; the
widespread use of English as a means of facilitating communication throughout the world; and
the increasing importance of non-national structures in law.  Part VII discusses these
phenomena in order to demonstrate that former domains of pluralism and difference indeed are
receding, but that difference itself remains undiminished.  Rather, its nature and provenances
are changing, due to rapidly multiplying reconfigurations that characterize our time.  
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3Comparative law’s challenge lies in deciphering significance amid reconstituting categories so
as to unravel deceptive appearances, whether of unchanged legal significance surviving under
a mask of change, or, conversely, of changed legal significance evolving under a surface that
appears to remain static (Part VIII).  In this task, comparative law’s effectiveness as a
translator of the foreign will depend on how well its acquired skills and methods can be
adapted to new kinds of foreignness.   
Part IX offers a concrete application of comparative law analysis as translator of current
European legal developments, and shows why comparative law is needed urgently today in a
world in which law increasingly absorbs influences and ideas that have crossed national
borders and have blurred traditional legal classifications.  
The Conclusion section discusses comparative law’s need for fluctuating methods and
resistance to formulaic approaches as the field continually must reestablish its equilibrium in
changing contexts.  Comparative law’s continuity is in the permanence of its location between
the same and the other, an attribute it shares with language.  This necessitates ongoing
reconnoitering as the poles of sameness and otherness shift in form and substance, elusive to
detection and prediction, requiring comparative law to undergo internal methodological
metamorphoses in keeping with the metamorphosing world.    
II. Simple Observations
Comparative law’s most visible connection to language is due to different legal
systems’ legal texts being in different languages.  Issues of foreign law’s accessibility arise
where comparatists are not fluent in the relevant foreign languages.  If translations exist,
corollary issues arise, such as whether a legal text can be studied productively in any language
but the original.  
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studies, comparatists necessarily will be limited in the range of legal cultures they can study by
the foreign languages they know.  Moreover, if foreign language knowledge is crucial, then
even a polyglot comparative law scholar may not be able to communicate successfully to
students who are unable to read foreign texts except in translation, thus reducing comparative
law’s educational potentials.
To the extent that translation is considered to be a viable option, how should
translations be elaborated where a legal phenomenon has no exact equivalent in two
languages?  It is common in comparative law to translate certain words by approximation, so
that, for example, the French word ‘procès’  generally is translated into English as ‘trial’, even
though innumerable attributes associated with the French ‘procès’ are not attributes of ‘trials’. 
Some authors add explanations to such effect in footnotes.  The problem with this solution is
that lengthy explanations will be necessary for a great many terms, making the translation of
even a short legal text so cumbersome that it can not be achieved without an encyclopedic
volume of explanation in footnotes.  
One need only consider that if the French ‘procès’ is not a ‘trial’,  it is in part that the
French ‘juge’ also is not a ‘judge’, or at least that, if she is a ‘judge’, she only is so in some
ways, but not in others.  Further, if the French ‘juge’ is not entirely a ‘judge’, it is in part
because the relevant ‘cour’ or ‘tribunal’ is not exactly a ‘court’, and so on and so forth, with
virtually limitlessly connected concepts that are not quite equivalent when any word is
translated.  Thus, the explanatory footnotes will be unwieldy unless drastic short-cuts and
omissions are made, which in turn, however, would leave readers with an exaggerated and
misleading impression of similarity to their own legal systems.
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5 An alternative approach is to leave in the original language words that translate poorly. 
 The appearance of a word or phrase in a foreign language and in italics will alert the reader to
the irremediably foreign nature of the underlying concept.  The obvious disadvantage of this
technique, however, is that an untranslated word is not accessible to the reader in the absence
of explanatory references.  Thus, by leaving a word in a foreign language, a comparatist will
succeed in conveying that the concept at issue is foreign and without exact equivalence, but
will not in this manner transmit the concept. 
Translation may appear to be a decreasing problem to the extent that English emerges
as the single, dominant language of the field, with increasingly accomplished levels of fluency
among those for whom it is not a native language.  This would be an incorrect conclusion,
however.   The language of law is bound to the inner grammar of legal systems, cultures and
mentalities, which in turn impede communication in words that are borrowed from another
legal system, culture and mentality.  As the rest of this chapter seeks to show, the complex
comparative nature of language also characterizes law, making comparative law of paramount
importance as a translator of law, but only so long as comparative law remembers that the
comparative undertaking remains one of translation.            
   
III.  Plurilinguism , Imagination and Comparative Law
    As chapter 16  (Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies) discusses, comparative
law scholars today generally agree that the field encompasses  the exploration of the nature of
law in society, such that the examination of foreign law is an aspect of comparative legal
scholarship, rather than its defining attribute.  The more reconfigurations law undergoes in its
dynamic interaction with a world in transition, the more comparative law must become a
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2 This is the principal theme of Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Re-Membering Law in the Internationalizing World’
(forthcoming) 34 Hofstra LR.
3 Another debate concerns the  legitimacy of undertaking translation between two domains of law. Neil Walker,
‘Postnational constitutionalism and the problem of translation’, in J.H .H. W eiler, Marlene Wind, (eds.), European
Constitutionalism  Beyond  the State (2003), 27 ff.
4 The term originated with Noam Chomsky.  In his most recent book on linguistics, Chomsky has revised his
theory to reject the term, but he continues to consider language structure as ‘invariant’.  Noam Chomsky, New
Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (2000), 7 ff. 
5 Donald D avidson, Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (1994), 186 ff.
6 Bernhard Grossfeld , Core  Questions of Comparative Law (Vivian Grosswald Curran, trans. 2005); Bernhard
Grossfeld, Josef Hoeltzenbein, ‘Globalization and the Limits of Language’, in Werner Krawietz (ed.),
Rechtstheorie  (2004), 87 ff. Bernard Hibbitts, ‘Making Sense of Metaphors:  Aurality and the Reconfiguration of
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process of decoding legal presences that are like languages whose connotations change just as
they begin to acquire meaning, languages in which all of the speakers are among the
uninitiated.2
As this section discusses, the decoding process, whether of foreign language or law, is a
process of translation.  Understanding translation’s mechanisms thus illuminates the processes
of comparative law.  Translation is both de-coding and re-coding, identifying and constructing
meaning.  Translating between languages involves vast networks of associations of a word in
one language that can not all be transposed into the other, such that there must be loss of
connotative significance in the process.  At best, translation achieves an overlap of some
meanings between two domains, as in an intersection of sets, but not total overlap, as in a
union of sets.  The extent to which translation can succeed is a matter of debate.3  Similarly,
the extent to which comparative law can succeed in communicating the other in law is a matter
of debate.  
Linguists and philosophers of language diverge on how communication takes place,
and on whether any communication means, or can mean, an exchange of equivalent concepts.  
Theories also range as to whether and to what extent all languages may share deep structures.4
There is dispute as to how to define the concept of language.5  Finally, and crucially, the status
and role of language are not the same in every society and legal order.6  In comparative law,
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9 George Steiner, Language and Silence:  Essays on Language, Literature and the Inhuman  (1967), x ff; Vivian
Grosswald Curran, ‘Metaphor Is the Mother of All Law’, in Roberta Kevelson (ed.), Law and the Conflict of
Ideologies (1995), 65 ff.
7
analogously, theories range as to how to define law; whether too little equivalence links legal
orders, such that they are not mutually communicable; or whether, on the contrary, law shares
deep structures throughout the world.  Also analogously to language, the status and role of law
are not the same in every society.
   For present purposes, it is sufficient to posit that there are irreducible untranslatables
between languages.   A vast and varied literature links the phenomenon of untranslatability to
the conclusion that language uniqueness arises from, and in turn also fortifies, a unique world
perspective, an irreproducible manner of seeing and understanding.7   This attribute of
language has significance for comparative law beyond the similarity of the field to translation. 
It means that knowing a second language allows entry into another world, a way of seeing
through another lens, into ‘incommensurable systems of concepts’.8  Consequently, for
comparatists, knowing the languages of legal systems they study signifies access to all that the
texts of law imply and connote, but do not state, to their infinity of links to the contexts that
spawned them and that they also affect.  It has been suggested that communication always lies
beyond language.9  The kind of openings to perspective, to ways of thinking and feeling, that
an additional language offers, also allows one to intuit the nature of the closures and barriers to
intercontextual understanding that are comparative law’s greatest challenges, even before one
locates,  identifies, and learns to overcome the particular impediments in the particular study at
hand.
The polyglot knows that much alterity is not apparent.  The polyglot legal comparatist
knows that legal orders reside as much beneath and aside from words as they do in the words
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On Steiner, see George Steiner, No Passion Spent:  Essays 1978-1995 (1996), 142 ff.  Accord, Ernst Cassirer,
Language and M yth (Susanne K. Langer, trans.) 1946.
 11 George Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things:  What Categories Reveal About the Mind (1987); George
Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (1980).
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that purport to embody them.  Ernst Rabel’s insistence on multilinguism for legal comparatists,
like George Steiner’s for literary comparatists, stems from the premise that, since knowing
another language is a powerful and crucial entry into another world vision and universe of
thought, it more importantly indirectly transmits the fact that other world visions and universes
of thought exist and are to be apprehended.10   Beyond the particulars of two differing
underlying networks of meaning, knowing another language expands one’s imaginative
capacities to encompass an understanding of the nature of differences, the imperfections of
translation, the pitfalls to constructing equivalences, and the likelihood that newness and
difference will have unexpected locations and provenances in another system of thought.
Immersion in more than one language, and the struggle to translate between languages,
highlight tapestries of interlinking threads that are woven into infinity, connections between
past and present, and among spiraling associations inspired by words and phrases in a unique
syntax, endless links of threads to connecting ties.  It is a messiness that one can approach but
not reduce without distortion.  Just as comparison is an act of translation, so too translation is
an act of comparison, and the word ‘comparison’, after all, admits of being less than exact
correspondence.  Comparison is of the order of simile, not metaphor.
The process of translating from one language to another is the basic pattern not just of
comparative law, but of all analysis, of cognition.11  Thus, the monoglot also engages in the
same process within a given community of signs, or semiotic system, for translation is
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12 George Steiner, After Babel:  Aspects of Language and Translation (2d ed., 1992), xii.  One who considered
those ‘teeming difficulties’ was Isaiah Berlin throughout his life’s work, and in particular in his Concepts and
Categories:  Philosophical Essays (Henry Hardy ed.), 1999.
13 ‘La langue est fasciste .’  Roland Barthes, ‘La leçon,’ in Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France (1978) .
14 Umberto  Eco, interview by Bernard Pivot, Double je, TV-5, émission du 25 juillet 2005.
15  Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de M ontesquieu,  Usbek à Rhédi’, in Lettres persanes (1721), 
LXXX (‘L’imagination se plie d’elle-même aux mœurs du pays où l’on est’).
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‘formally and pragmatically implicit in every act of communication, in the emission
and reception of each and every mode of meaning … To understand is to decipher.  To
hear significance is to translate.  Thus the essential structure and … means and
problems in the act of translation are fully present in acts of speech, of writing, of
pictoral encoding inside any given language.  Translation between different languages
is a particular application and model fundamental to human language even where it is
monoglot … [One should] consider … the teeming difficulties encountered inside the
same language by those who seek to communicate across spaces of historical time, of
social class, of different cultural and professional sensibility’.12
The passage between discourses of difference that comparative legal analysis demands will be
less well performed by monoglots because monolinguism deprives one of a rigorous training
and insight into both detecting and conveying alterity that conscious translation endows.  
Roland Barthes said that ‘language is fascistic’. 13   In advocating the search for a ‘hazy
polylinguism’ (‘un polylinguisme flou’), rather than a single perfect, or even imperfect
language, Umberto Eco notes that ‘a language always is a prison … because it imposes a
certain vision of the world’.14  A language imprisons thought and understanding.  Many
languages liberate them.
Automatic understanding accompanies immersion in another society:  ‘Imagination
conforms on its own to the customs of a country in which one is located’.15  Knowing the
language of others brings such an intuitive, automatic understanding of the other.  It enables
polyglots to gain insight into foreign ways of being foreign, and to bend their cognitive grids,
so as to be more open to absorbing data that monoglots will be unable to process.  Language
pluralism locates one elsewhere.  For comparative law, language knowledge not only is part of
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foreign legal systems under examination; it is the most efficient shortcut to understanding how
to understand.  
IV. The Universal and the Particular in Post-War Comparative Law and Language
We have suggested through the translation metaphor that comparative analysis can not
be valid unless it is keenly attuned to elements and domains of difference and, most
fundamentally, unless it is attuned to expect changes from unexpected provenances and kinds
of difference. If plurilinguism, multiplicity and the detection of alterity are comparative law’s
trump cards, then it may seem as though comparative law should choose difference over
sameness.  This section shows that, for comparative analysis, those attributes are not crucial
because difference is an ultimate goal, but, rather, because it is only by identifying difference
that one can identify both difference and its equally important counterpoint, similarity.
Somewhat paradoxically, western comparative law was steered towards the
identification of similarity after the Second World War by those whose plurilinguism attuned
them to the importance of difference.  The field since then experienced a reaction, tending
increasingly towards privileging difference.  This section shows some striking parallels
between the fields of comparative law and language concerning the issue of sameness versus
difference.  It first discusses the issue in terms of the contrasting conceptions that undergird the
civil and common law legal systems.
In western legal discourse, historically and traditionally the common law perspective
was primed on the particular and specific, on cases, the accumulation of facts within each, and
the mosaic which cases create as a pointilliste composite.  Continental European civil law
traditionally embraced the universal and general, and marginalized the particular.  In this one
may see a link between civil law and the Enlightenment, with its premises of overarching
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16Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law:  Legal Uniformity and the
Homogenization of the European Union’, (2001) 7 Columbia J European Law, 63 ff.
17 Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment:  Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (2001); Stuart
Hampshire, Spinoza and  Spinozism (2005).
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19 This is a principal theme of Vivian Grosswald Curran,  ‘Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S.
Comparative Law’, (1998), 46 Amer. J Comparative Law 43 ff., discussing the work of Ernst Rabel, Konrad
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20Ibid.  The word ‘nation’ derives from natio , originally used to signify the ‘other’. Amos Elon, The Pity of It All: 
A Portrait of the German-Jewish Epoch 1743-1933 (2002),  23.
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coherence and unity; and between the common law and Romanticism, with its focus on the
particular, the individual, and, therefore, the different.16 
  Spinoza, whose work arguably is far more crucial to understanding the Enlightenment
than generally has been credited,17  believed in universals.  He wrote, however, that because of
the human incapacity to apprehend more than a few of the links of causality in the
concatenation or great, overarching chain of events, humans must act as though the world were
one of contingencies rather than universals.18  As we will see below, comparative law scholars
after the Second World War inverted Spinoza’s admonition, acting as though the world were
one of universals, regardless of their personal experiences of a world governed by turbulent
contingencies.  They believed that in universals lay whatever hope there might be for
preserving civilization.
The identification of core human similarities as a hallmark of post-war comparative
legal studies and theory derived from several sources.  Some of the reasons were unrelated to
the Second World War, and included Enlightenment-inspired views.  Other reasons did relate
to the war, shaped by a reaction against fascism’s legalized persecution of those it had defined
as different.19  Along with racism, nationalism, with its concentration on differentiating an in-
group from an out-group, was seen as having been the scourge implicated in Hitler’s rule, to be
repudiated in favor of a tolerance based on human-wide commonality.20  
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Post-war comparative law, like much western political thinking, urged not just non-
nationalistic, universalist concepts, but, more particularly, it urged law itself as the remedy to
political terror and ideology.   The post-war generation of comparatists, including those who
had not known exile personally, was undeterred by the spectacle of law’s degradation in
Hitlerism and Stalinism.  On the contrary, their position was substantially Gustav Radbruch’s,
who elevated law to having a powerful redemptive capacity for self-perpetuation and for
creating enduring civilization by excluding as non-law such measures as a state may issue that
violate the most fundamental values of civilized society.21   The theoretical underpinnings for
this stance have roots in natural law, thereby marking a reversal of course from the
increasingly positivistic legal perspective of the pre-war era.22  
As Nathaniel Berman has recounted,23 faith in law as the primary, ultimate and durable
solution to age-old barbarism also had inhabited the legal scholars of the interwar years,
following the First World War.  After the Second World War, it was revived by some of the
very scholars who had had an opportunity to observe the fallibility of their views.  Hans
Morgenthau described this phenomenon of repeat mistake with prescient irony as he observed
the renewed article of faith taking form in the 1940s yet again, calling it an ‘inveterate
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art27
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260  ff. 
25 René Cassin, La Pensée et l’action (1972).
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tendency to stick to … assumptions and to suffer constant defeat from experience rather than
to change … assumptions in the light of contradicting facts ….’24
    The Nobel laureate René Cassin may be said to have been one of the clearest
incarnations of this phenomenon, having been active and prominent in international law circles
both in the interwar and the post- World War II periods.  His writing reflects his unchanged
faith in the power of law, and he became a principal drafter of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.25  His unflagging courage, dedication, humanity and brilliance more than
explain his reputation and the honors heaped upon him.  One  may wonder, however, if his
post-war eminence may not in some measure also have been due to the tenacity of his refusal
to sink into disillusion with the law despite a life of much personal hardship that included
confrontations with law’s darkest potentials to enable and execute  abject state terror.  That
such a man could maintain his lifelong faith in law’s capacity to become a nearly universal
panacea may have held great appeal for those whom his example enabled to credit law in
similar fashion, allowing them to keep intact a cherished ideal that history otherwise may have
compelled them to consider an illusion.    
Post-war comparative law tended to assume that a perception of others as different
invariably is the first step towards hatred and discrimination, which in turn may culminate in
legalized persecution, as had been the case in Nazi Europe and as legal theorists such as Carl
Schmitt, Julius Binder and Karl Larenz, among others, had supported.  The link between
otherness and hatred has not been indissociable throughout history, however.  René Girard
argues that, contrary to general belief today, it is sameness, rather than difference, which elicits
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visceral hatred, as illustrated among others in antiquity’s violent discrimination against twins.26 
Vladimir Jankélévitch coined the term ‘le presque-semblable’, ‘the almost-the-same’, in
arguing, based on Freudian theory, that the greatest hostilities in society arise neither from
sameness nor difference, but from minimal otherliness.27  
Nor has the assessment of sameness and difference been a matter necessarily dependent
on the historical era in question.  An insight that captured a great deal about Rousseau and
Diderot, who were contemporaries, suggests that, while Rousseau feared the other, Diderot
feared the same:  ‘Rousseau’s savage evolved the concept of ‘man’ to fix and stabilize the
gnawing anxieties stemming from his fear of the other, [while] Diderot’s moi [“I,” by contrast]
…fear[ed] the same’.28    
Language studies have their own version of comparative law’s intense focus on
whether legal systems throughout the world are (1) fundamentally similar, such that apparent
differences are superficial in nature, justifying universalist conclusions; or (2) fundamentally
different, such that apparent similarities are misleading, and universalist conclusions
unwarranted.  Noam Chomsky views language principally as universal, such that the
differences are relegated to a marginal role.  In his most recent book on linguistics, he writes:  
‘[W]e know that the diversity and complexity [of language] can be no more than superficial
appearance[;] that all languages are variations on a single theme [; and that] language structure
[is] invariant, except at the margins.’29  
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Chmosky therefore situates the unshared, individual, internalized aspects of language,
which he calls ‘I-language’, at the periphery.  One might derive from the very concept of ‘I-
language’ a diametrically different picture of the nature and constituent elements of language,
however.  Accordingly, both Willard van Orman Quine and George Steiner create an ultimate
portrait of language as primordially non-universal, dominated by Chomskian ‘I-languages’ that
are fundamental, not marginal, thus particularizing language, and rendering particularity
essential.30  Where Chomsky sees the defining attributes of language in universals, they
emphasize that assumptions of universality and similarity are unwarranted, and that they
obfuscate barriers to communication which result from language particularities.31  
On the other hand, according to Wittgenstein, an entirely private language must be a
conceptual incoherency, 32 since, as Charles Taylor has put it, ‘[t]he genesis of [language] …is
not monological … but dialogical’. 33  Notwithstanding all of the problems relating to
verifiability in semantics, language is meaningless and even inconceivable in complete
isolation because it can not exist without community and communication.  This conclusion
need not contradict the importance of particularity and difference to language.  It indicates,
rather, that for language, as for comparative law, the issue is one of balance. 
V.   Recent History
1.  Languages and Comparative Law Theory in the Post-War Generation
The generation of comparatists immediately following the Second World War was
steeped in many languages, products of classical educations strong in the tradition of
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mutlilinguism, including Greek and Latin.  Those who left Nazi Europe further perfected their
knowledge of the languages of new host countries.  Since many emigrated to common law
nations, their immersion also was into the ‘other’ of the legal culture and mentality from the
ones in which they had been trained.  
Reading legal texts in their original languages was an obvious practice that did not
figure as an explicit preoccupation of their scholarly writing about comparative law.  Post-war
comparative law thus was conducted by those who were well equipped to understand the
nature of translation, the challenges to conveying meaning from one community to another, the
disguises of the seemingly similar, and the depth and nature of differences.  
Rudolf Schlesinger’s memoirs, a book not intended either for publication or for a legal
audience, was written to tell his American children and grandchildren of the trajectory their
grandparents and great-grandparents had undergone, and to describe a European ‘otherness’ to
American progeny.34  It recreates the world of those whom Victor Klemperer  in his diaries so
aptly called ‘Goethedeutsch’.35  It also is a subtextual story of the legal translating which
informed his methodological approach, and provides a glimpse into the generation of dual-
identity comparatists that followed the Second World War.
  Schlesinger conveys his youthful adventures with practicing German law under Hitler,
a narrative of many social and legal metamorphoses, including the struggle to persuade legal
authorities to treat previously established principles of traditional, unrepealed German law as
though they were printed in an ink stronger than that of Hitler’s superimpositions in the ever-
changing palimpsest that constituted law in Germany from 1933 to 1945.36  It was a losing
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battle, as the government had foreseen the contest between the two legal regimes vying for
supremacy, and had mandated that the palimpsest be construed exclusively through the ink
from the Nazi presses if the texts that might seep through from the past otherwise would thwart
political ideology.37 
Schlesinger was experiencing a dual existence as an outsider permitted until 1939 to be
a lawyer on the inside of the system that was starting to erase his own legal existence.38  He
had become a foreigner-native, advocating  a law whose meaning was disappearing as it
became an unintelligible archaism, cluttered with newly enacted contradictory principles, and 
as unchanged legal texts from the past transmogrified when they became subject to an altered
system of judicial interpretation and definition.39  
Schlesinger then recounts his steps in absorbing the common law and its bewildering
language as a much confused ‘1-L’ student at Columbia Law School after emigration to New
York.  One watches the seeds of understanding a new law and world germinating in a mind
whose initial methodological approach mirrored the twin tenets of his native German legal
training and mathematical mindset. 
Schlesinger later was to develop the ‘common core’ approach to law, reflecting his
dedication to human-wide universals as central to his vision of a transcendent tolerance.40 
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Numerous post-war comparatists shared this outlook.41  That his analytical approach did not
ignore differences of context as he engaged in finding commonalities that unite systems may
be seen between the lines of his autobiography; in the enthusiasm with which he embraced and
added to his common core theory Sacco’s legal formants, those icons of contextual difference
that are latent and elusive to detection;42 and by his own statement at the end of his career that
the search for differences also was crucial to the ‘common core’ project.43  
  As was the case for many of his colleagues of similar age and education,
plurilinguism, both literally and figuratively, informed Schlesinger’s scholarship and was
central to it, without being an explicit part of the scholarly comparative project he elaborated.44 
This meant, however, that the superb comparative skills of the polyglot and dual-identity
comparatists were an unspoken component of their methodology, and that their comparative
law scholarship transmitted ideas the next generation of students would be less well equipped
to execute, other than those whose life experience had replicated immersion in more than one
language and society.   
Imre Kertesz wonders if one can get an idea of water from those who drink it.45  The
post-war generation drank directly from the sources.  The challenge for comparative law is to
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convey the tastes and textures of the sources to those who have not drunk from them.  The
problem is acute in the classrooms of the United States, a country whose educational system
has yet to wage a war against pervasive monolinguism.  If there was failure of imagination on
the part of the post-war generation, it was in not envisaging the order of limitation the single-
identity monoglot faces.  
The substantive objective of detecting commonality and unifying human-wide legal
principles was challenged by the next generation of comparative law scholars.46   It is the issue
of the universal versus the particular, the same versus the different.   As others have argued,
however, the ‘core’ of law is both common and distinct.47  Comparative law’s modes of
analysis should enable it to shed light on how to take in the image of the world with as little
preconception as can be mustered:  ‘[T]he world is not to be narrowed till it will go into the
understanding … but the understanding is to be expanded and opened until it can take in the
image of the world ….’48  In this task, it is helpful to remember Wittgenstein’s caution that
‘[t]he limits of my language are the limits of my world.’49
2.  The Next Generation
The recent history of comparative law has seen changes that have mirrored intellectual
trends since the Second World War.  Western intellectual discourse gradually espoused group
claims as postmodernism and multiculturalism gained ascendancy, and a new generation
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turned its attention to the national, contextual and linguistic differences that are irreducible,
and that conflict with the idea of a search for commonality.50  
The idea of a common core to law can be seen in many comparative law undertakings
still today, from the Trento Common Core of European Private Law project that adopts
Schlesinger’s approach as a model, to the proposals for a European Civil Code and a common
contract law.  Opposition to such projects sometimes has stemmed from considerations such as
maintaining national traditions deemed essential to cultural identity, 51 and has included the
argument that differences trump similarities, such that a project of legal unification is doomed
to remain illusory.
The postmodern tendency has been to debunk universals, in keeping with Lyotard’s
view that western postmodernism is coterminous with loss of belief in any of the
metanarratives that claim universalism, such as religion, socialism or the Enlightenment.52  The
proponents of difference in comparative law are part of the pendulum swing away from the
post-war generation.  It has been suggested recently that ‘[t]o accord difference priority is the
only way for comparative legal studies to take cognizance of what is the case’.53  As Derrida
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signaled, however, neither identity nor difference is foundational, nor either derivative of the
other, because they are interdependent, each conceptually incoherent without the other.54   
Martti Koskenniemi has summarized the debate in similar terms of an interdependence
in which the universal depends on the local for its expression, and is unintelligible without it,
such that one can consider the particular to be a channel for the universal, a means of its
expression.55    Habermas envisions fusion of the universal and particular in law:  ‘The
universalism of legal principles is reflected in a procedural consensus, which must be
embedded in the context of a historically specific political culture through a kind of
constitutional patriotism.’56  He criticizes postmodernism for its ‘suspicion of an
indiscriminately assimilating and homogenizing universalism [and for] … obliterat[ing] the
relational structure of otherness and difference that universalism, properly understood,
precisely takes into account’.57  
The historian John Higham said that the refugees from Hilter’s Europe were America’s
first multiculturalists.58  The comparative law scholars following the Second World War in the
United States and Great Britain were no exception, but their scholarship did not make this
evident.  Their collision with multiculturalism and postmodernism derived from both a failure
to elaborate explicitly what remained an unspoken attention to difference, context and
incommensurables, and from the fact that they revived universalist claims incompatible with
most renditions of postmodernism and multiculturalism.  To the extent that contemporary
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comparative law’s postmodernist tendencies cause it to apprehend the world as consisting of
‘structures of otherness’ that consign us to coexistence without the possibility of mutual
understanding or meaningful communication across legal communities, implicitly the field
would consider legal communities to be divided not just by incommensurables, but also by a
Tower of Babel. 
  
VI. Babel 
Comparative law has experienced the debate over universalism and pluralism as
consisting of mutually contradictory aspirations.  As we have seen, the post-war generation put
its plurilinguism at the center of its search for a universal language of law, an Esperanto to
reconcile all of humanity.  In this, it echoed the goal of a single law for all of civilization that
Saleilles expressed during the first modern international congress of comparative law in
1900.59  
Historically, language and law both have known relentless human aspirations towards a
universalist perfection that would eliminate disorder.  These continue today. In law, some of
this may be viewed as the ‘legocentrism’ Günter Frankenberg coined to denote the perils of a
field that inflates its own importance.60  Those immersed in law have a tendency to suggest
political and social solutions based on law.  The principles of translation evoked above imply
that comparatists will convey law poorly if they view it in isolation from the social, political,
historical and cultural influences that inform it, and that create the environment of the humans
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who people its institutions.61  Plurilinguism in the figurative sense requires
interdisciplinariness.    
Legocentrism may explain why legal scholars and legal actors exaggerate law’s
capacity, tending to view it as an ideal and universal panacea, but universalist aspirations for
law are widespread also in the larger population.  More generalized than legocentrism within
the field is an urge, as intense among the lay population as among legal specialists, to believe
that law represents a solution to the problems of human conflict and a potential remedy to past
barbarism, if only the right law and legal order can be identified, codified and enacted.  
Universalist claims both fortify this perspective, and ensue from it.  To view law as
subject to the vicissitudes of transitory human perceptions and contemporaneous values, as are
all other social institutions, is to recognize that there are no final solutions to barbarism that
law can provide in a reliable and durable way.  As Nathaniel Berman has put it, however, in a
title that explains the strength and tenacity of the refusal to acknowledge the full measure of
law’s limitations and vulnerabilities, ‘But the Alternative Is Despair…’62.     
Language has inspired similar hope and faith in its perfectibility.  George Steiner’s
After Babel63 and Umberto Eco’s The Search for the Perfect Language64 tell the tale of the age-
old anguish born of earth’s many mutually incommunicable languages, and of each individual
human language’s incapacity to achieve a transparent reflection of the world through the
medium of words.  The despair that no spoken language can match signifier to signified in a
one-to-one correspondence has been linked to the Biblical message that such a perfect
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language existed before God created the confusion at Babel to punish man.  By the twentieth
century, one sees in Gottlob Frege’s work, and the beginning of modern philosophy of
language, that the ideal of an entirely unambiguous language also is considered to be the key to
discovering the nature and functioning of thought.65  Eco tells us that an obsession with finding
a single, redemptive, perfect, universal language is to be found in every culture in the world.66   
Steiner, like the postmodern legal comparatists, turns the Babel story on its head,
seeking to resolve the mystery of the incommunicable.  He explores how it is that many
mutually incomprehensible languages persisted within geographical areas too small for
distance to explain their multiplicity, and concludes in the tradition of Romanticism that
language profusion is metaphoric of a human-wide desire to develop individual worlds of
difference in which the enduring and productive richness of imagination can best flourish and
be preserved for future fertility.
   Steiner suggests that the value of particular languages is in being untranslatable, in
not being subject to communication to the ‘other’.  Since to translate is possible only to the
extent of shared elements in more than one language, in the measure that translation is
successful, languages are not unique.  If unicity is the goal, then the chaos of Babel can
become more desirable than its alternative of communication.  If one finds Steiner’s thesis
improbable, one may wish to reflect on the fact that Heine was reproached in Germany for
having written poetry which translated too well into other languages.  According to Amos
Elon, it was in Heine’s having crafted a German that could be communicated easily outside of
German that his critics charged him with treachery to the language.67   
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In Steiner’s work, language multiplicity incarnates the value of the particular and the
local.  A more recent study, Vanishing Voices,68 the collaboration of a linguist and
anthropologist, analyzes the vastly accelerated rate at which languages are dying across the
planet today, and likens the phenomenon to an irremediable loss in biological species.   It
raises the specter of a sterile world converging towards one language, an ‘after Babel’
monolinguism of loss.  Vanishing Voices argues the irreplaceable nature of loss when the
number of languages diminishes in the world; After Babel allows one to divine the measure of
loss in the degradation and death of any one language. 
It should be remembered, however, that no matter how immeasurable losses in
difference prove to be, difference itself does not diminish.  Rather, the terrains of difference
shift, such that the importance of some of the differences that have mattered most in the past
will recede.  For comparative law, as the world globalizes, it is foreseeable that the field’s
traditional skills for grasping the nature of national, including language, contexts will be of
decreasing usefulness in their particulars.  The acquired skills will retain value to the extent
that having developed those skills allows the field to adapt so as to perceive and interpret new
orders of difference.   
VII. Language Deflation and the Growth of the Non-National
Ours is an era of simultaneous language deflation and law inflation (see Part IX), both
of which are eliciting considerable anxiety.69  The increased dominance of English is a much
debated topic in comparative law; in law; and in many other fields.   Efforts to reverse or even
halt the trend to use English seem to be as ineffective as efforts to defend any one language
from foreign importations within it.  Even autocratic rulers lack power to control language
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evolution.  Bernhard Grossfeld tells us how Marcellus is reputed to have instructed the
Emperor Tiberius that, no matter how great the ruler’s power, it extended over people only, but
not over words.70
On the other hand, English is changing as it enters other languages.  Inexorable as
language evolution may be, where host languages absorb foreign words, the foreign imports
are altered in a highly complex process of assimilation reminiscent of the transformation
process Watson describes for legal transplants.71  Conversely, an accumulation of imported
words affects and alters the host language.   In law, the limitations of the English legal
language to express concepts that extend beyond the boundaries of its underlying common law
context have led to a modification of English in the form of new words spawned by concepts
of civilian origin.72  Thus, where many languages cede to a dominant single one, the ascendant
language must expand to accommodate to difference, transforming itself in the process.  
  Just as Steiner wondered at the evolutionary significance of language multiplicity
where geographical distance did not provide an adequate explanation, today one can wonder at
the evolutionary significance of language diminution, including the extraordinary rate of
English importations into European languages where the imported vocabulary seems to replace
words already in existence, rather than to add new meanings.73    There is little doubt of an
ultimate language impoverishment as one language emerges to dominate others, but the wealth
of  subtleties lost in the ascendancy of English is part of those kinds of distinctiveness  that are
dissolving around the world.  Their disappearance is a scent on the trail comparatists can
follow in detecting new subtextual changes as old divisions and categories reconfigure.
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One such reconfiguration is the contemporary trend away from the national.  The
transformation of the national into the non-national is most striking when even efforts
originally dedicated to reinforcing national strengths are subsumed into detracting from them. 
Today, measures designed to preserve linguistic pluralism no longer principally reinforce
nation states, including those measures intended to do so.  Thus, in the EU, support for
linguistic diversity originally was centered on the preservation and flourishing of member state
national languages, but now has transmuted into support for the rescue and even renaissance of
subnational languages, some already moribund, in the name of  ‘Europe’s cultural wealth and
traditions’,74 and pursuant to the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.75  
France provides an example of a state which throughout centuries and in various ways
undertook to develop, preserve and promote French as the exclusive language of the nation
through legal regulation.  Until recently, this meant discouraging the use of languages other
than French, including its own territory’s ancient regional languages.  As recently as 1992, the
French Constitution was amended to state that French is the nation’s language.76   
As English came to be considered a greater threat to French than its own regional
languages,77 and pursuant to EU policies, France reversed course in favor of the very sort of
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linguistic pluralism it traditionally repressed as subversive to the national.78  The French
government’s current promotion of subnational languages whose survival minority populations
consider threatened is in a relation of paradox, if not complete contradiction, with its objective
of protecting the national language. 
This tangled web is the latest in a history of efforts to define, preserve and purify
French over centuries, from errors in philology that once caused clerics to attempt to freeze the
language in illogical spelling,79 to endowing the Académie française with legal authority to
define and regulate French.  The country’s history of projects to govern language among others
testifies to the indomitable force of language in resisting direction and governance. 80 
Language traditionally has emerged as stronger than any law purporting to control it, like a
butterfly escaping from its chrysalis in colors impossible to predict and flying in unknown
directions.  Current evidence suggests the towering difficulties of regulating language either by
positive measures, such as financial support, or by interdictive measures, such as legal
regulation of linguistic criteria.81 
 In their ungovernable and independent paths, languages resemble nothing more than
law, whose history also is one of resistance to stasis in meaning.  As the humans who operate
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legal institutions change in beliefs and values over time, the subtextual meaning of law drifts
with them.  When such ‘ideological drift’82 occurs despite unchanged, unamended language in
legal texts, it may be due to conscious subversion, but equally often to innocent, unknowing
shifts reflecting an ever-changing ‘constitution …written in the citizens minds’ that, according
to Ernst Cassirer, inevitably, perpetually and always changeably, determines law’s meaning.83  
The variables that affect the evolution of both language and law are innumerable, and originate
in many non-linguistic and non-legal sources.  Comparative legal analysis therefore can not
help but be interdisciplinary if it is to be effective in understanding and conveying law.84  The
0extent to which law’s transitions elude detection is the extent to which they also preclude
reaction and direction by legislators, regulators and educators.      
VIII. Familiarity and Foreignness
Translating the foreign into the familiar ends by clarifying the familiar that one
discovers also to be foreign.85  For comparative law, this means clarifying one’s own legal
framework through perspectives the foreign adds to one’s lens of vision.  As Arthur Rimbaud,
one of France’s nineteenth-century ‘accursed/wretched poets’, poètes maudits, said with
metaphoric prescience and alienation a century later,  ‘je est un autre’, ‘I is another’,86 a theme
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Franz Kafka renewed in the twentieth century (‘I have hardly anything in common with
myself’)87 and that Imre Kertesz generalized beyond the personal to the whole of the human
race (‘we have nothing in common with ourselves’),88 as well as by scholars including Julia
Kristeva in Strangers to Ourselves.89  As a field that has specialized in examining the outside,
the other, comparative law is situated to see the foreign in the familiar, so as to elucidate the
familiar.  
The divided self that confronts its own ‘other’ was the basis for Rousseau’s social
contract between the self-individual and the self-citizen.90 It also became the foundation for
Stuart Hampshire’s conception of justice in heterogeneous western constitutional democracies. 
Hampshire posited that no set of substantive values would be shared by all populations within
the ever more diverse national communities of western democracies, such that justice systems
can not legitimately impose any single set of substantive norms.  Rather, the fair hearing
should serve as the cornerstone of justice inasmuch as each individual has conducted internal
hearings when in inner conflict, thereby creating ubiquitous recognition of the value and
fairness of a system based on listening to each side.91 
For Hampshire, the experience of the foreign ‘other’ within a fragmented, conflicted
self is a defining human attribute, and a cause for celebration.  Both Kristeva and Edward Saïd
have suggested beauty in the further identity disruption experienced by those who undergo
physical exile from their country of birth.  Kristeva equates it with a ‘weightlessness in the
infinity of cultures [that] gives [the exiled] the extravagant ease to innovate’.92   
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Unlike the nineteenth-century poètes maudits who lived in an inner exile, exiles from
lands of birth know language displacement and disruption as part of their experience of the
foreign.  Some, like Theodor Adorno, emigrate from their homeland because it is the
unpleasant price they must pay for physical survival.  Exile was so bitter for Adorno that he
returned to Germany after the Second World War, explaining his return as the longing to be
reunited with the language of his birth.93 In this, he was in a tradition of German-Jewish writers
starting with Heine, who declared that his fatherland was not Germany, but German, the
language.94 Adorno most famously said that the holocaust had transformed poetry, that
ultimate tribute to the power and beauty of language, into barbarism.95 Barbarism was the
Greek word for foreign.   For him, the familiar had become the foreign, irremediably altered in
his manner of experiencing it.  Adorno’s remark was reminiscent of Walter Benjamin’s view
that barbarism is embedded in the very concept of culture,96 and a forerunner of still others
who foresaw the legacy of twentieth-century totalitarianism’s abuse of language as the
beginning of the end of language itself.97 
According to Adorno, it is in the foreign and barbaric only that one can see the
familiar:  ‘He who wishes to know the truth about life must scrutinize its estranged form’.98 
Only the estranged, the barbaric, the ‘other,’ can be noticed because the familiar, taken for
granted, becomes invisible.  The estranged is a conduit to noticing the familiar because it is
that which we are able to see.  Zygmunt Bauman extends Adorno’s and Benjamin’s ideas by
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suggesting that estranged forms do not just show us sameness through showing us difference. 
Rather, what appear to be differences may be the germinated form of unsuspected seeds long
implanted and embedded within the familiar.99  Just as the study of metastasized cells can
reveal previously unperceived functions of the normal, we can see in ‘estranged forms’ how
the familiar carries the potential for its own dramatic metamorphoses, and thereby better
identify the development of those potentials. 
Once we understand that even the familiar is foreign, we also see that it is not just the
‘other’ which requires translation: so does sameness, since sameness masks alterity (‘I is
another’).  Visible otherness merely renders visible the need for translation, and permits one to
observe its processes.  Those processes of translation also are the ubiquitous mechanisms of
meaning construction and comprehension.  Thus, translation always is at work, even within the
apparently same system of signs, only less easily observably so when interlocutors are not
aware of what communication and exchange imply.100 
If comparative law is the translator of the law of others and otherness, but if translation
is not the making equivalent of foreign languages, only a lantern that makes visible how ‘every
mode of meaning’101 signifies, then, by extrapolation, what can  comparative law have to offer? 
 If everything is foreign because, ultimately, the self is another,  then in deciphering the
officially, visibly foreign, and also the foreign that is masked by the familiar, does comparative
legal analysis do something that is not being done through legal analysis tout court?  Is
comparative law a fraud in posing as something different from the regular run of legal
analysis?  
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In its essence, comparative legal analysis is just legal analysis, since comparison is not
unique to the field of comparative legal analysis, since, rather, all analysis, legal and other, is
comparative at heart.102   Comparative law is merely an ‘estranged form’ of the familiar. 
Comparative law remains key to understanding law, our own and others’, because of its habits
and history, its accoutrements, because it is conversant in otherness, in approaching and
dealing with the alterities of languages, histories, and legal mentalities.  It is our best bet today,
because it is the field with the biggest head start towards deciphering the peculiar newnesses of
the contemporary legal world, in which law has become mobile and, it has been suggested, a
product of exchange.103    Comparative law can begin the process of detecting the unseen that
lurks beneath the seen if it can put to fruitful current uses its own history of venturing into
contexts that enlarge the practitioner’s cognitive grids, enabling the assimilation of 
information that can be processed no other way than by extending the limitations of
imagination.  
Law’s messiness can not be reduced.  If  comparative law can be an effective translator,
it may be by conveying messiness more accurately, thereby allowing for a deeper
understanding of the ways in which law is changing, the subtle new associations and linkages
occurring as old distinctions give way to new ones.  In our globalizing world, the distinctions
associated with geography, including statehood and language differences, are fading as English
becomes ubiquitous and even nation states that have not restructured officially are dealing with
non-national normative claims, entailing legal changes of a non-national nature.  The struggle
to understand legal phenomena that do not fit within the traditionally exclusive categories and
nomenclatures of law:  namely, the national or the international, extends to trying to identify a
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new vocabulary capable of encompassing the novelties, tentatively termed by some as
‘transgovernmental’; by others as ‘post-national’, as unfamiliar phenomena continue to unfold
in a dynamic of mutual interaction with the words that name them.104    
Comparative law is the sleuth of significance, of legal meaning, and its old antennae, so
carefully and painstakingly attuned to the sorts of hidden change that challenged past
generations, now need to be adapted to unearthing new configurations.  Its objective should be
to become so pervasive that it disappears.  Its greatest contribution would be to convince all
those who analyze law today that comparative law must be part and parcel of their
undertakings, and consequently to merge into invisibility by making itself part of a familiar
that it permeates, shedding its own distinctiveness in a globalizing world which needs the
methods and skills the field has developed to be infused into all forms of legal analysis.
IX. Translating European Law:  Examples
Europe today is one of many arenas of legal change in need of comparative analytical
methodology.  The difficulties of perceiving how law is transforming in Europe are magnified
still further on the world scale, where legal encounters involve states and sources less
connected by history and geography than are the current European member states. Even in
Europe, like silences between words, a host of legal changes are passing unobserved under the
mantle of observable change.   Conversely, unchanged legal concepts persist under misleading
guises of change.  
European institutions such as the European Court of Justice and European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) are spaces of encounter and exchange that have become more than the
sums of their parts, having developed considerable legal convergence in a distinctive emerging
culture. National legal publications purporting to report their decisions often fail to include
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much needed comparative analysis, however, filtering the foreign aspects of European court
decisions through domestic legal frames of reference that result in distortion.  
The failures of translating legal meaning in renditions of European court decisions tend
to be exacerbated when the national legal publication and the country whose law was analyzed
by the European court are not from the same legal system, as could be observed when a major
French legal publication excerpted and analyzed an ECHR decision in a case on assisted
suicide that had originated in the United Kingdom.105  The choice of which excerpts to
reproduce from the lengthy European decision was the first step of inadvertent transformation
of the European court decision in its presentation to the French reader, who typically would be
following European law to the extent it is likely to impact a domestic legal practice, and would
read European decisions only in the versions national legal publications publish.  
In its manner of abridging the ECHR decision, the French publication did not just
shorten the original; it expurgated the ECHR’s common law analysis, thus omitting those
portions of the ECHR decision that would have been inhabitual in a French court decision.106
These included ECHR reasoning by analogy among cases in their factual contexts.  The French
rendition preserved ECHR references to cases through factually decontexualized, normative
principles more familiar to civilian legal thinking. 
The scholarly analysis which followed the French rendition of the ECHR decision
further magnified the failure to translate legal meaning from the European context to the
domestic one, as it portrayed aspects of the court’s decision as being substantively defective
when in fact they reflected a common law manner of reasoning.  Notably, the French scholar in
civilian manner was indignant that the ECHR had referred with approval to UK policy that not
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every defendant whose conduct violated the relevant statute against assisted suicide need be
prosecuted.  There was no discussion of the UK policy as rooted in a systemically different
legal approach, nor of the possibility of latitude for the ECHR to approve of it.107  The result of
such purported domestic republication and explanation is a rendering familiar of European law
to a national legal community through use of the legal code of the home mentality, freeing
European law from confusing foreignness by recoding it according to the categories of the
reader’s member state legal order.  
Conversely, symbols of new legal convergence throughout Europe by means of an
apparently common vocabulary also can be deceptive and illusory, and perpetuate legal
differences that remain unrecognized.  Assumptions in both civil and common law systems
that European law today has adopted the common law concept of case law are widespread but
largely erroneous.  The acceptance by civil law states of European court decisions as a source
of law appears to be a change towards legal convergence because it sounds reminiscent of
common law methodology and practice, and because the common law term ‘case law’ is used
extensively by civilians.  
For the civilian, the concept of  ‘case law’ is the validation of court decisions as a
source of  law, but such decisions then are reduced to what, in common law parlance, is only
one component part of a court decision:  the ‘rule’ of the  case, a normative principle from
which future case solutions will be deducible.108  For the common law lawyer, however, ‘case
law’ is an intricate network of significance in which legal principle is fused indissociably with
particular, contextualizing facts from a host of cases.  In the common law, an individual court
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decision becomes the basis for future detailed inductive reasoning, to be conducted by
comparisons among multifarious aspects of other cases that fit within an arguable, and to-be-
argued, range of similarity.  For the civilian, even the court decision that has acquired the
stature of law is understood as a normative rule resembling a code provision. The civilian
conception of ‘case law’ thus has not assimilated cases-qua-law in the common law manner,
which would require not just recognizing court decisions as a source of law, but also would
require a fundamentally altered understanding of the nature of law when cases are its source.
A common law feature has penetrated the EU, however, in the piecemeal pattern of
change increasingly characterizing legal development in all EU member states. The evolution
proceeds from detailed directive, or other individual European institutional command, to the
reactive changes in member state domestic law in order to become compliant with new
European law.  It is a direction antithetical to the civilian pattern of legal change emanating
from an initial, a priori, overarching coherence associated with the very idea of law and legal
legitimacy.109    
  This pattern of change in Europe, coupled with the principle of subsidiarity, has led to
a particularized drafting style, inhabitual and discomfitingly unfamiliar to the civilian legal
public in its expectations of such language.110  It is reminiscent of the detailed common law
statute that similarly arose from a piecemeal system:  namely, from the common law tradition
of courts creating unenacted law by means of cases, and of the legislature’s interference as
being the exception rather than the rule, occurring only where the legislature wrests control
over particular matters it deems necessary to take into its own hands from the a priori accepted
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ubiquity of judicial governance.111   Part of the civilian frustration with perceived ‘legislative
inflation’ in European member states today can be explained by its association with this
suspect pattern of legal change that is experienced as the reverse of law’s proper course from
the whole to the particular.  
Law profusion also recalls the fascist period, in which there was an explosion of
statutes that undermined the prior rule of law through outer garments of legality veiling
profound change and, as was later judged, abdication rather than preservation or promotion of
law and rule of law.112  The association between statutory abundance and the subversion of law
also has roots that go back further in modern civilian legal thinking, as Portalis’ explanation of
the drafting of the French Civil Code reveal.113  
Along with an ideal of keeping laws few in number, the sparse style of the civilian legal
norm is considered inseparable from law and the rule of law because it is considered to have
proven its ability to withstand changed circumstances.  As exemplified by the Prussian code
that failed before Napoleon’s succeeded,114 abundant language and abundant law are deemed
fated to outlive the problems they address, entrapping society by legal texts that eventually
bind senselessly, because they become helpless to resolve future problems time-bound
legislators inevitably fail to foresee.115
The civilian view that legal quantity and linguistic specificity in enacted law cause
injustice, law subversion and social mayhem may owe more to historical contingency than to
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causality, however.116  The lessons Continental European nations learned that caused national
codifications to espouse a general, loose style of language, widening future interpretive
potential, do not take into account the alternative possibilities for balancing legal stability with
societal changes that the common law developed in a much different pattern, one that has
included narrowly drafted legal norms arising as circumstances in society were deemed to
justify their enactment.  Unreflective associations arising from particular historical trajectories
confuse the issues today as Europe seeks to reconcile two substantially different legal
traditions and mentalities within a single supranational judicial system.   
X.  Conclusion
Comparative law as translator can be envisaged as cybernetics for the irreducible
messiness of legal concepts that are wedded to the language which encases them and to the
connotations which adhere to them.  The physicist Freeman Dyson describes cybernetics as ‘a
theory of messiness’,117 and its Greek etymology as evoking one ‘who steers a frail ship
through stormy seas between treacherous rocks’.118  According to Dyson, the founder of
cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, was a former child prodigy who became immersed in the cultures
and languages of both pure and applied mathematics, engineering, and neurophysiology, and
translated among all of them.  Wiener determined that ‘the messiness of the real world was
precisely the point at which his mathematics should be aimed’.119  
As this chapter has discussed, comparative law and its practitioners have long been
interpretants attempting to steer through the messiness of the foreign by reordering it into the
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language of the familiar without betraying the original.  Today’s world of dizzying legal
changes, and the accelerated rate at which changes are occurring, heighten comparative law’s
difficulties, even as the field increasingly finds itself  implicated in world events. 
Comparatists have ceased being remote from reality like the philosophers an empress once
envied:  ‘You philosophers are fortunate. You write on paper, and paper is patient.  I unlucky
empress write on the sensitive skin of people’.120 
As Ugo Mattei has been exhorting his colleagues to remember, scholarship is an
important influence on European legal and political decision-making in this foundational
period, and will affect millions of people for a long time to come.121  In other parts of the
world, new encounters of laws and legal norms occur, crossing borders of geography,
statehood and, most confusingly, crossing traditional categories for law and legal meaning.122 
Analyses and interpretations of interlocking, often mutually irreconcilable claims will affect
decision-making as the reshaping world seeks to solidify emerging concepts of legitimacy and
legality. 
Comparative law tends to be least acknowledged and most often absent where legal
analysis does not involve visibly divergent legal orders.  It is needed urgently in contexts of
unrecognized metamorphosis, however, and today metamorphoses are burgeoning in murky
areas outside of the traditional rubrics of either national or international law.123  The less
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apparent, the less visibly foreign, the foreign is, the more comparative law’s task of translation
involves finding and forming the vocabulary to transmit new configurations that resist
detection and articulation.  The field is acquainted with the uneasy transitions of words and
concepts from foreign legal contexts to a targeted audience’s frames of reference.  This
acquaintance is its arsenal for discerning new manifestations of legal significance.
  However much comparative legal analysis can clarify, the process itself is not
amenable to scientific method.  Like language, inevitably imprecise and perpetually in flux,
comparative law can not be frozen once and for all, to be captured for future application if only
it is developed with sufficient acuity and insight.  It shares what Isaiah Berlin attributed to
philosophy and distinguished from the scientific: it does not carry within itself the way or
method of its own solution, and therefore does not lend itself to formulaic approaches.124   
This means that comparative law can not be transmitted from one generation to the next.  Each
generation bears the task of developing methods that will allow the field to remain an effective
interpretant of contemporaneous legal meaning.
Great scientists show how generalizations can be integrated into formulae that become
the basis for future scientists of lesser abilities to use, in order to make deductions in what
Berlin called ‘uninspired progress’.125  Comparative law evolves differently.  Its progress
cannot be accomplished in such small linear advances, but requires changing the very
perspective from which problems are conceived, and debunking entrenched, established
orthodoxies:
‘To take so vast a step as to liberate oneself from the incubus of an entire
system of symbols – and it is scarcely possible to distinguish symbols from thoughts –
to shake oneself free of so obsessive a framework, requires genius and intellectual
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strength and independence of the highest order.  The new construction, if it is created
by a man of creative as well as destructive talent, has an immense and liberating effect
upon his contemporaries, since it removes from them the weight of a no longer
intelligible past, and a use of language which cramps the intellect and causes the kind
of frustrating perplexity which is very different from those very real problems which
carry the seeds of their own solution in their own formulation.  The new system, born
of an act of rebellion, then becomes a new orthodoxy, and disciples spring up on all
sides, eager to apply the new technique to new provinces to which the original man of
genius had perhaps not conceived of applying them.  This is sometimes successful,
[but] sometimes leads to a new and equally arid and obfuscating scholasticism.  Once
the new orthodoxy has won the day, this in its turn, by making concepts rigid, by
creating an ossified system of symbols no longer flexible in response to the situations
which had originally led to the revolt, creates new frustrations, new insoluble problems,
new …  perplexities.’126 
As translator of legal meaning, comparative law always has had to invent and reinvent
tools with which to translate.  The paradox is that this undertaking, however descriptive in
nature its ultimate objective may be, requires the ability to destroy its own past rigidities and
manners of perceiving, its own methods of decoding and transmitting, in order to construct a
new modality of analysis, a new vocabulary better adapted to changed contemporaneous
meaning in the perpetually chameleon-like world of new presences, claims, standards and
influences, in which the legal and extra-legal increasingly crisscross to the point of becoming
indistinguishable, and whose junctures are the more difficult to perceive to the extent that they
are unexpected. 127   Comparative law, like Berlin’s rendition of philosophy, can and must
maintain logical rigor, but it is the antithesis of final answers, of absolute truths, such that, in
comparative legal analysis there can be ‘no final method of dealing with problems’.128  
The field’s strength lies in exposing law’s complexities, and its tentacles lodged in
every aspect of life.  Comparative law’s fragility is the fragility of law, a concept no sooner
defined than changed in meaning.  The discourse of law has been characterized as ‘a creative
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art27
129 Pierre Bourdieu, Ce que parler veu t dire (1982), 21 (“Le discours juridique est une paro le créatrice, qui fait
exister ce qu’elle énonce’.)  
130 Paul de M an, Blindness and Insight:  Essays in the Rehetoric of Contemporary Criticism  (1983) (1971) 11 (“It
is the distinctive privilege of language to hide meaning behind a misleading sign.”).   Kertesz (n. 45)  121, has
gone a step further:  ‘Language indicates something that the understanding is not able to follow: is language also
an illusion of the senses?’ (‘La langue indique quelque chose que la connaissance est incapable de suivre:  la
langue est-elle aussi une  illusion des sens?’)
131 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre nous:  Thinking-of-the-Other (trans. Michael B. Smith & Barbara Harshav)  (1998)
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language, which gives existence to that which it articulates’.129  Like the law of the ‘other’ it
seeks to transmit, comparative law ultimately also is subject to the language in which it is
couched, that gives it sense, and  that, as Paul de Man believed to be the distinctive privilege of
all language, is equally adept  at hiding as at bestowing meaning.130
It has been said that the distance ‘between the same and the other [is] the gap in which
language stands …’131  This does not make language transparent or efficacious, honest or able. 
Rather, it situates language and evokes its pitfalls and potentials.  Like language, comparative
law also stands in the gap between the same and the other.  Like language, comparative law
faces the stark pitfalls of miscommunication and misunderstanding, but, also like language, it
possesses the unique and breathtaking potentials of learning to see, to communicate and to
shed light in that elusive, inevitable, shifting and ever-reconfiguring gap between the same and
the other.
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